Property Law: The Estates of Missing Persons by unknown
PROPERTY LAW: THE ESTATES OF MISSING PERSONS
This comment compiles and critically analyzes the various statu-
tory provisions enacted for the preservation and distribution of
the property of missing and unaccounted-for persons. Special
emphasis is given the recently enacted North Carolina statute be-
cause of its enlightened and comprehensive approach.
THE PROBLEMS inherent in the handling of property owned by one
who has disappeared and remained absent without explanation are
both numerous and difficult. As long as it is not known whether he
is living or dead, fights must remain uncertain and his property
is rendered virtually useless. The obvious need to satisfy the in-
terests of the absentee's family and creditors and to keep property
in the stream of commerce while at the same time protecting the
absentee from the dissolution of his estate led to the enactment of
remedial legislation in a number of states.'
The early attempts to provide statutory relief,2 however, were
limited to general probate administration of the estate after a cer-
tain period of absence which corresponded with the time the ab-
IFor a general discussion of the states having such legislation and their varying
provisions, see Committee on Administration of Property of Infants, Incompetents
and Missing Persons, Report, 102 TRUSTS & ESrATFS 908 (1963).
- There seems to be a dearth of authority on the judiciary's power, apart from
statute, to act for the purpose of conserving and protecting the property of a missing
person. In Webster v. Franklin County Trust Co., 313 Mass. 401, 47 N.E.2d 934
(1943), the Probate Court dismissed a petition in equity for the appointment of a
successor receiver to manage the property of an absentee, asserting that "the ap-
pointment of receivers of the property of absentees and the distribution of the
property are provided for by statute. . . . Those subject matters are not within the
scope of equity jurisprudence . . . [but] must be dealt with on the probate side of
Probate Court and not in equity." Id. at 403, 47 N.E.2d at 936. The court did, how-
ever, note that although the statute did not contain a provision authorizing the
appointment of a substitute receiver to succeed one who had died, "such authority
is inherent in the Probate Court, and necessarily incidental to the accomplishment
of the purposes of the statute .... " Id. at 404, 47 N.E.2d at 936.
A dictum in In re Safris, 112 F. Supp. 146 (D.N.J. 1953), intimated that the court
might perchance have the authority "under its general equity powers, to conserve
and protect the property of a missing person." Id. at 146. At least one commentator
has expressed the view that "it is likely that a Court of Equity has inherent power,
even in the absence of statute, to provide for the preservation of the property of
and the support of the dependents of missing persons." Gray, Trust Problems in Con-
nection with the War, 16 CONN. B.J. 347, 354 (1942).
Courts have occasionally relied on equity jurisdiction to authorize certain acts
performed by the trustee for an absentee which otherwise might be outside the pale
of the statute. See note 54 infra.
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sentee was presumed dead. The relief afforded by these statutes was
often rendered nugatory because of the rigid but well-accepted prin-
ciple that the foundation for that probate jurisdiction rests ex-
clusively upon death. 3 Thus, the Supreme Court in Scott v. Mc-
Neal4 held that subsequent proof of the continued life of the ab-
sentee retroactively destroyed the court's jurisdiction; the appoint-
ment of the administrator and all acts performed by him or others
in reliance on the court's jurisdiction were deemed violative of due
process and void.5
It has been suggested that there is no tenable basis for the Scott
decision at the present time.6 Arguably, American probate courts
are courts of record and should therefore have the power to pass
upon the questions of fact which determine whether they have juris-
diction. If a court is possessed of this power, it would follow that an
erroneous determination should not void the entire judgment ab
initio3 Despite such contentions, however, the Scott precedent is
still extant, and states endeavoring to cope with the absentee prob-
lem must frame their solutions to comport with the due process re-
quirements enunciated by the Court. Most states have now enacted
special statutes relating to the estates of missing persons in an at-
tempt to meet the requisites of due process. In the first case to test
such a statute, Cunnius v. Reading School Dist.,8 the Supreme Court
3 Griffith v. Frazier, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 9, 23 (1814); In the Matter of Estate of
Paulsen, 179 Cal. 528, 178 Pac. 143 (1918); Springer v. Shavender, 118 N.C. "33, 23
S.E. 976 (1896). See 41 COLUmn. L. Ray. 744 (1941); 43 HARv. L. Ray. 485, 486 (1930).
' 154 U.S. 34 (1894).
5 The absentee in Scott alleged that the administrator's receipt of money from a
debtor of the absentee would not discharge the debt and that the administrator's
conveyance of property would pass no title. Id. at 35. The fundamental question
involved was whether letters of administration issued upon the estate of a person
who is in fact alive have any validity. Id. at 39. The Supreme Court held that the
presumption of death derived from continued absence was only presumptive evidence
of death. The Court reasoned that since the only jurisdiction of a probate court
is over the estate of a dead man, when the continued life of the supposed decedent
rebuts the presumption there is no ground for sustaining the jurisdiction of the court.
Id. at 48-49.
Similarly, as jurisdiction rests upon the fact of death, the notice given assumes
that fact and is not addressed to the absentee but to those interested in his estate.
No judgment of a court can accord with due process of law if rendered without
jurisdiction in the court or without notice to the interested party, and the court
deemed both elements to be lacking in the case of the reappearing absentee. Id.
at 49-50. See also Beckwith v. Bates, 228 Mich. 400, 200 N.W. 151 (1924).
'See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.3, at 562 (1952).
7 Ibid.
S 198 U.S. 458 (1905). The Cunnius Court disposed of the Scott case by stating
that the opinion in that case did not imply that states are without power to provide
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held that it was within the states' police power to provide their
courts with jurisdiction to administer the estates of absentees by
special proceedings,9 provided these proceedings prescribed a reason-
able period of absence, afforded adequate notice and protected the
absentee's interests should he in fact be alive.' 0 Where these re-
quirements are satisfied, the statutes have generally been upheld."
The purpose of this comment is to examine current statutes re-
lating to estates of absentees. It is divided into two parts. Part I
will undertake a review of those sections of the statutory schemes
which provide for the conservation of the absentee's property and
discharge of his obligations during his absence. Part II examines
those provisions which supply the machinery for determining the
death of the absentee and for the ultimate distribution of his estate.
Because many of the provisions of the newly enacted North Carolina
statute12 represent major advances over both the prior law in North
Carolina and most of the presently existing law in other jurisdictions,
special emphasis will be placed on this statute where it is warranted
in the hope that this approach will emphasize the need and provide
guidelines for the enactment of similarly enlightened legislation.
Part I. CONSERVATION OF PROPERTY OF ABSENTEES
Pursuant to the typical conservatorship provision, a probate
court, upon application of an appropriate party, may appoint an
individual who will exercise designated powers in behalf of the
absentee. The primary purpose of such a provision is the conserva-
their courts with jurisdiction to administer the estates of absentees who might in
fact be alive when they did so by special and appropriate proceedings. Id. at 473.
On the contrary, the Court viewed Scott as holding only that, absent special legisla-
tion and under a law giving probate courts jurisdiction to administer the estates
of deceased persons, the court was without jurisdiction if the presumption of death
after a stipulated period of absence was later rebutted by proof of the absentee's
being alive. Ibid. See 25 So. CAL. L. Ritv. 447 (1952).
9 The pattern of the special statutes diverges from that of the general laws
relating to the distribution of a deceased person's estate. The general laws employ
the state's probate jurisdiction, whereas under the special provisions the state's
police power is being exercised for the reason that "property without a known
owner should be conserved by the state having jurisdiction over it." Lees, Property
Rights of Persons Who Have Disappeared, 9 MINN. L. REv. 89, 93 (1925).
10 198 U.S. at 476-77.
' See, e.g., Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); Stevenson v. Montgomery, 263 Ill.
93, 104 N.E. 1075 (1914); Walz v. Dawson, 235 Mich. 344, 209 N.W. 177 (1926).
See generally Sevier v. Bank of America Nat. Trust &. Say. Ass'n, 101 Cal. App. 2d
184, 225 P.2d 3 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); In re Nelson's Estate, 37 Wash. 2d 397, 224
P.2d 347 (1950).
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-1 to -22 (Supp. 1965).
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tion of property.' s Accomplishment of this objective inures to the
benefit of the state as well as to the absentee or those who would
have an interest should he not return. The state legitimately has
both a paternal interest in protecting the property of a citizen who
is unable to do so himself and a sovereign interest in preventing the
deterioration of property located within the state bounds. 14 Other
objectives may also be perceived in many of the statutes and include
such salutary purposes as the support and maintenance of depen-
dents of the absentee. 15
Although some states have unique conservator provisions, the
fundamental structure of the various statutory schemes is basically
the same. For that reason, Part I will consist of a general statutory
survey designed to indicate and assess the elements likely to be
found in the typical statute.
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Residence of absentee: To invoke judicial jurisdiction under
these statutes, it is initially necessary to determine whether the
missing person must satisfy a residence requirement before he can
qualify as an absentee under the statute. Approximately one-third
of the statutes require that the missing person be a resident of the
state before the jurisdiction of the appropriate court may be in-
voked.16 The remaining states require only that the absentee be
1 Marshall v. Marshall, 159 Kan. 602, 606, 156 P.2d 537, 539 (1945); Leahy v.
Wayne Probate Judge, 227 Mich. 40, 45, 198 N.W. 432, 433 (1924).
"4Cf. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
1 See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
'
6 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 260; GA. CODE ANN. § 113-2701 (1959); NEB. Rxv. STAT.
§ 30-2001 (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. § 156.010 (1959); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 33-20-1
(1956); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4-27 (1957).
The New York statute requires that the absentee be a person whose estate, were he
dead, would be subject to the jurisdiction of the surrogate. N.Y. Sumut. Cr. Aar § 126.
This requirement appears similar in effect to the UNIFORM ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF
DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY Acr § 3, which has been adopted in Maryland, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 16, § 202 (1) (1957), Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1804 (1955), and
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 268.23 (1) (a) (1957), and makes "domicile" the crucial
factor.
The stringency of the requirement of proof of residence in California was indi-
cated in In the Matter of Estate of Lowe, 19 Cal. App. 2d 271, 65 P.2d 113 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1937), where the court stated that the language of the statute "admits of no
conclusion other than that before any legal action with reference to the administra-
tion of the estate of such a person may be taken or had, the fact must be established
that he was (or is), a 'resident of this state'; and of course, in order that such fact
may properly, regularly, and legally be made to appear, it must not only be pleaded
and proved, but as well, must be so adjudicated. In other words, that fact constitutes
a jurisdictional element in the proceedings;-in the absence of which no legal order
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owner of property within the boundaries of the state.17 The residence
requirement may be justified as a method of insuring that the ab-
sentee and his dependents will be more surely afforded adequate
notice of the conservatorship imposed, but any statute must meet
minimum standards providing such insurance. On balance, the
property ownership requirement is perhaps a more desirable pro-
vision in view of the conservational purpose which has been in-
terposed as the primary justification of absentee statutes. 18
Length of absence: Most states require proof that the absentee
has been missing and unheard of for a certain length of time,19
and in at least two states the mere fact of absence for a designated
period will, without more, justify judicial action.20 Although the
newly enacted North Carolina statute requires an absence of only
thirty days, 21 the period prescribed may vary from three months to
three years.2 2 In several states, no stipulated "period" of absence is
necessary to invoke the statute23 and ostensibly the question of in-
definite and unexplained absence becomes one of fact. It is sug-
gested that due regard for the conservation of the property and the
protection of dependents militates in favor of a shorter absence
in the premises may be made." Id. at 275, 65 P.2d at 114. Cf. In re Curran, 94 N.J.
Eq. 723, 120 Atl. 786 (Prerogative Ct. 1923).
1 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-87 (1960); FLA. STAT. § 747.01 (2) (1963); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 15-2101 (1948); IowA CODE § 633.580 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. § 395.410 (2)
(1960).
18 See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
20In Day v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. App. 2d 681, 54 P.2d 502 (Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 560 (1936), the court rejected a constitutional chal-
lenge that a ninety-day absence was too short a time limitation to be consistent with
due process. The challenge was made by an insurance company which was objecting
to the efforts of a trustee appointed for the absentee to exercise a conversion option
in the policies. The court stated that the question of an appropriate period of
absence is "purely legislative" and that a court cannot substitute its opinions for the
legislative judgment "unless the unconstitutionality of the statute is so apparent on the
face that no circumstances can be assumed under which it might have a constitutional
operation." 11 Cal. App. 2d at 683, 54 P.2d at 503.
.oIDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2102 (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:39-1 (1953).
.1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2 (a) (Supp. 1965).
22The most common period of absence utilized is three months. E.g., CAL. PROB.
CODE § 260; GA. CODE ANN. § 113-2701 (1959); MICH. Comp. LAWs § 705.29 (1948);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.04 (1947); NEB. RFv. STAT. § 30-2001 (1964). Some states, how-
ever, require an absence of one year. E.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 395.410(2) (1960); N.H.
Rav. STAT. ANN. § 553:18 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:39-1 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 320.1202 (1950); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-20-1 (1956). Other states may require
even longer periods of absence. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-701 (1961) (two years, al-
ternative provision); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2305 (1958) (three years, alternative
provision).
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 747.01 (1963); IowA CODE § 633.580 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 200, § 1 (1955); WASH. Rav. CODE § 11.80.010 (1956).
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period, although the statutes which stipulate no requisite lapse of
time may be even better equipped to achieve these ends since they
may be invoked as soon as the absence and the need for conservator-
ship become apparent.
Other jurisdictional requirements: In addition to possible resi-
dence and length of absence requirements, most states impose addi-
tional jurisdictional requisites of proof relating to the circumstances
surrounding the disappearance or to other facts existing at the time
of or subsequent to the disappearance. Such statutory demands
vary significantly from state to state. A few states require proof of
disappearance under circumstances which indicate or lead to the
conclusion that the absentee is dead or that his absence is due to
insanity or amnesia.24 A specific showing may be required as proof
21'FLA. STAT. § 747.01 (a) (1963) (circumstances indicating death or disappearance
as result of mental derangement or amnesia); GA. CoDE ANN. § 113.2701 (1959) (cir-
cumstances leading to conclusion of death); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 553:18 (1955)
(judge believes absentee to be dead); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2119.01 (Page 1954)
(circumstances affording reasonable ground for belief that he is dead, cannot return,
or refuses to return); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2305 (1958) (circumstances satisfying
probate court of reasonable ground for belief that he is lost, insane or dead).
The New York statute requires a disappearance "under circumstances, which afford
reasonable ground to believe either that he is dead, or that he has become a lunatic,
or that he has been secreted, confined, or otherwise unlawfully made away with, or
that he has been made a prisoner of war or has been detained or interned by
an enemy country or in an enemy-occupied country ...." N.Y. SURR. CT. ACr § 126 (2).
Prior to a 1961 amendment, the New York courts were vigorous in their requirement
that the circumstances indicate death. In re Ostromislensky's Estate, 110 Misc. 189, 180
N.Y. Supp. 267 (Surr. Ct. 1920).
In Germain v. Germain, 31 Misc. 2d 401, 220 N.YS.2d 1013 (Sup. Ct. 1961),
the court sympathized with the wife of an absentee who was forced by the rigors
of the absentee property statute to petition for separation from her husband in order
to protect the property. The court stated that under the provision "the circumstances
of the disappearance must indicate death and be inconsistent with his being alive.
While the defendant here may be dead, the circumstances under which he disappeared
are not inconsistent with his still being alive. He could be either. The presumption
of life must therefore control." Id. at 405, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 1016. (Emphasis added.)
An appeal by the Germain court to the legislature for remedial action was answered
by enactment of the 1961 amendment, which changed the statute by adding the
provision that "for the purposes of this subdivision, circumstances affording reasonable
ground to believe that an event described in this paragraph has occurred include
circumstances pertaining to the behavior, habits and situation of the missing person
before his disappearance and the absence of known facts providing a different ex.
planation for the disappearance and the failure of diligent search to discover the
abode of the missing person." N.Y. SuRR. CT. ACr. § 126(2). Subsequent to passage
of the amendment, in In re Mathiez' Estate, 38 Misc. 2d 498, 237 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Surr.
Ct. 1963), evidence of disappearance and a fruitless search was held sufficient to indi-
cate a showing of death. The court said that a broader interpretation of the statute
would thereafter be recognized in light of the effort by the legislature to loosen the
jurisdictional requirement.
Henley v. Wadleigh, 88 N.H. 174, 186 Atl. 505 (1936), involved the New Hampshire
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that the property needs supervision25 or that without supervision
it is likely to be lost or damaged.26 Also, proof of a diligent search
or inquiry into the absence is demanded by some states.27 Finally,
a few jurisdictions have statutory provisions especially designed to
indicate circumstances which will justify the appointment of a
representative for a missing serviceman.2 8
To be sure, the unnecessary appointment of a representative
for an absentee is undesirable. But experience has indicated that
rigorous adherence to overly strict requirements as to circumstances
of disappearance may render the conservator provision useless in
ameliorating the hardships at which it was directed.29 The revised
North Carolina statute, for example, now permits the appointment
whenever "after diligent inquiry . . . [the absentee's] whereabouts
remain unknown to those persons most likely to know the
same.... ."30
Special provisions-absentee need not be "missing": In a com-
mendable effort to protect abandoned families, four states have pro-
statute. The court in that case refused to permit the administrator to take into
his possession property which had been held by the absentee as a life tenant. The
court said that to permit this would be in derogation of the belief upon which
the validity of the appointment of the administrator depended; namely, that the
absentee was dead. The court also held that the remaindermen were not entitled
to the property since they "may not regard the death to be established .... So far
as relates to their title, the probate court's belief, and consequent finding, of the life
tenant's death is . . . of no effect in determining its [life estate's] termination,"
Id. at 176, 186 Ad. at 506.
25E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 4101 (1953); NEV. REV. STAT. § 156.010 (1959);
N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT § 126 (2); Om REV. STAT. § 127.010 (1963). The New York re-
quirement that the appointment be necessary "for the protection of his [absentee's]
property" was found wanting in In re Ostromislensky's Estate, supra note 24.
2E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 705.29 (1948). In Leahy v. Wayne Probate Judge,
227 Mich. 40, 198 N.W. 432 (1924), the court rejected a petition for appointment
under the Michigan statute because "there is no proof that her [absentee's] property
is going to waste or is in danger of being destroyed or lost for want of a proper
custodian." Id. at 45, 198 N.W. at 433.
-7E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-87 (1960) (diligent search is presumed to have
been made for a missing serviceman); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2 (Supp. 1965) (diligent
inquiry); UNIFoRM ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PRoPERTY Aar § 3.
2 These statutes typically require that the missing person be "reported or listed
as missing, missing in action, or interned in a neutral country, or beleaguered, be-
sieged or captured by an enemy .... ." Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-871 (1956);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 4101 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 338-21 (1955); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 7-2307 (1953).
For a discussion of the problem created by war and application of the war ab-
sentee statutes, see Gray, supra note 2, at 352-57. Gray suggests as an alternative to
the statutes that the departing serviceman give a general power of attorney to some-
one to act in his behalf. Id. at 355.
29 See note 24 sup-a.
30 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2 (a) (Supp. 1965).
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vided that a receiver may be appointed for the property of a person
who has left the state without having made provision for the support
of a dependent wife or minor children even though his whereabouts
may be known.31 Provided that proper notice is afforded the de-
serter, such a provision seems eminently desirable as a protective
device.
PROPER APPLICANTS
In one respect, a measure of the possible utility of an absentee
property statute is the extent to which persons with a legitimate
interest in the property of an absentee are accorded the right to
invoke the statute. A few states have no limitation on the persons
who may properly petition the court to make an appointment, and
anyone from a needy spouse to an officious intermeddler may make
the application. 32 In other states the coverage is less broad and only
specifically described parties such as family members and creditors
may invoke the statute.33 Whether a person is qualified to petition
the court may necessitate reference to statutes other than the "ab-
sentee" provision. Thus, in a few states a petition may be filed by
one who would be entitled to administer the property of the absentee
were he deceased 4 or who would be authorized to act as guardian.35
Further, in some states, the court on its own motion is empowered to
execute the statute3 6 and presumably this would enable a person
who would otherwise not qualify as a petitioner to provide the
impetus for judicial action.
It is submitted that as regards proper applicants, the broader the
statute the better. The situations are numerous in which people in
different capacities would have a legitimate interest in seeing that an
absentee's property is cared for, his dependents maintained, or his
"1 D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-701 (1961); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2751 (1964); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 200, § 1 (1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.04 (Supp. 1965).
"2E.g., IDAHo CODE ANN. § 15-2104 (1948); IowA CODE § 633.510 (1964); WAsn.
REv. CoDE § 11.80.010 (1956); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4-27 (1959).
"3E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 260 (wife, family member, friend); HAWAII REV. LAWS
§ 338-21 (1955) (any person who would have an interest in property of absentee on
his death); MICH. CoMp. LAws § 705.29 (1948) (wife, next of kin, creditor); NmB. REv.
STAT. § 30-2001 (1965) (wife, family member, friend); NEv. REv. STAT. § 156.010
(1959) (family member, friend); OHIO Rv. CoDE ANN. § 2119.01 (Page 1954) (spouse,
next of kin); ORE. REv. STAT. § 127.010 (1963) (family member, business associate,
friend).
"4 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-701 (1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2 (Supp. 1965).
"MIss. CODE ANN. § 450-01 (1957).
30 E.g., AMz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-871 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 4101 (1953);
FLA. STAT. § 747.02 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-9 (1953).
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debts paid. So long as action upon conservator petitions is within
the discretion of the court, there would appear to be little objectiofn
to a statute which places no limitations upon the class of persons
who may file. The courts, aided by the particular jurisdictional
requirements, in a given state, are generally equipped to dispose of
those petitions which are intended as nuisances or are otherwise
without merit in the particular circumstances of the case.
NOTICE PROVISION
Although a few statutes have no express provision for notice of
conservatorship proceedings, 37 most of the states require that notice
be given of an application for an appointment of a representative
and of the date on which the application will be heard. The re-
quirement in many states is satisfied by the publication of the notice,
addressed to the public, in a designated local newspaper or legal
journal.38 A few states require that copies of the notice be posted
in a conspicuous place or on each parcel of land belonging to the
absentee.39 Such perfunctory notice would in all likelihood be of
primary benefit to creditors, and more direct notice to the absentee
and his family is required by some provisions. A common require-
ment is that a copy of the notice be mailed to his last known ad-
dress.40 The Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Absen-
tees' Property Act"1 and the North Carolina statute42 require, in
87 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-871 to -873 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§
4101-03 (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A:39-1 to -4 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-9 (1953).
No cases have been discovered which raise the issue of the sufficiency of prescribed
notice to satisfy due process requirements in connection with purely conservatorship
proceedings. Presumably, less would be constitutionally required in this type pro-
ceeding, which is aimed at protecting the absentee's property, than where a final
distribution is being made.
38E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 261; NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2001 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 156.020 (1959). See Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. at 459, 476-77.
.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-704 (1961) (copy posted in conspicuous place and
upon each parcel of land); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 200, § 4 (1955) (posted in two
or more conspicuous places in town where absentee last resided and upon each parcel
of land).
40 E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 395.450 (2) (1960); R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-20-2 (1956).
A few states also demand more particular notice to other interested parties. E.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2119.02 (Page 1954) (copy of notice mailed to spouse and
next of kin in the state).
' 
1 UNIFORbi ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY Acr § 3 (ab-
sentee shall be named as a party; any person who would have an interest were the
absentee deceased may, upon direction of the court, be made party).
42 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2 (c) (Supp. 1965). This statute provides for the following
parties to a conservatorship action: "the absentee, all persons who would have an
interest in the estate of such absentee if he were deceased, all persons known to
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addition, that the absentee and all persons interested in the estate
be named as parties to the action to insure not only notice but also
a binding decree which the absentee may not collaterally attack
subsequently. Further, during the period of management, addi-
tional notice may be required prior to the exercise of certain powers
by the appointee.43
Although it would appear somewhat futile, all precautions should
be taken to afford fair and adequate notice to the absentee as well
as his creditors and kin. One possible method of insuring adequate
notice would be to couple the "diligent search" requirement, im-
posed by some states as a prerequisite to jurisdiction,44 with notice
by publication and also by service.
APPOINTEE-QUALIFICATIONS AND PREFERENCES
A few statutes stipulate that the appointee45 must be of legal
age and a resident of a specified area or must be a person who would
be qualified to act as administrator or executor of the probate estate
of the absentee.46 Often, the spouse of the absentee or her nominee
is preferred over other potential appointees.4 7 Such provisions ap-
pear to be overly bound by traditional probate-administrator con-
cepts framed with a view to distribution of the assets of a decedent.
Such analogies are not well equipped to serve the conservational
purpose of the absentee acts, many of which may be invoked upon
a thirty-day absence. 8 This period is much shorter than most pre-
claim an interest in the absentee's property, and all known insurers of the life of
the absentee ...." Ibid.
"For example, notice may be required and a hearing held prior to authorization
of the sale of absentee's property. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
"See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
"The individual appointed by the court to act for the absentee will be desig.
nated by one of the many titles used by the various states. Conservator and trustee
are the most frequently employed names. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-87 (1960)
(trustee); FLA. STAT. § 747.02 (1963) (conservator); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-2701 (1959)
(conservator); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:39-1 (1953) (trustee).
Other titles include: ALAsKA STAT. § 20.05.130 (1962) (guardian); Ky. R.v. STAT.
§ 395.410 (2) (1960) (curator); MIcH. Comsp. LAws § 705.29 (1948) (special administra-
tor); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 553.18 (1955) (administrator); N.Y. Sut. CT. Acr.
§ 126(2) (temporary administrator); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-6 (Supp. 1965) (receiver).
"6E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2105 (1948) (a person of legal age, resident of county
where petition filed and who would be qualified to act as administrator); ORE. Rnv.
STAT. § 127.040 (1953) (person resident of county in which the application was made
and who has qualifications prescribed for an executor or administrator).
'
7 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 263; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.08 (1947); Nav. REv. STAT.
§ 156.040 (1959).
8 See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
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sumption of death limitations,49 and is thus quite remote from the
time of distribution. The Washington statute is therefore both
unique and salutary in admonishing the court that the appointment
shall be made "taking into consideration the character of the prop-
erty and the fitness of such trustee to care for the same .... "50
Other provisions have been designed to cope with special prob-
lems which may arise concerning the administration of certain kinds
of estates and property. For example, North Carolina has a com-
mendable provision for appointment of the county public admin-
istrator if the fair market value of the estate is less than 1,000 dol-
lars. 1 In the words of the draftsmen: "The purpose of this section
is to reduce unnecessary delay and expense to small estates by
utilizing the office of public administrators which provides an
inexpensive means of disposing of such estates." 52 Further, in a few
states, a temporary appointment may be made pending a hearing on
the petition for a permanent appointment if it is necessary for the
protection of the property.53 This latter type of provision would be
especially desirable to facilitate the management of operating
business enterprises necessitating immediate attention.
POWERS OF APPOINTEE
The authority which is vested in a person appointed to act in
behalf of the absentee should be comprehensive enough to enable
him to effectuate the policies of the statute and should be suffi-
ciently subject to the rigors of judicial supervision so as to afford
," Common presumptions of death take effect after five to seven years following
unexplained absence. See notes 92-94 infra and accompanying text.
rOWASH. REv. CODE § 11.80.010 (1956).
51 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-17 (Supp. 1965).
52 GENERAL STATUTES COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT ON AN ACT TO ADD TO THE GENERAL
STATUTES CHAPTER 28A TO BE ENTITLED "ESTATES OF MISSING PERSONS" 22 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as SPECIAL REPORT]. See McCall, Estates of Missing Persons in North Caro-
lina, 44 N.C.L. REv. 275, 280 (1966).
"' COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-20-3 (1963); IOWA CODE § 633.584 (1962) (temporary
appointment may be made only after a hearing considering such action); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28A-3 (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1202 (c) (1950); UNIFORM An-
SENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY ACT § 2 (3).
The wisdom of this type of provision is indicated by the draftsmen of the North
Carolina statute: "Being an adversary proceeding ... a certain amount of time must
necessarily elapse before the matter comes on for hearing and final determination.
Without a statute similar to this one, providing for interim custody and management,
the property of the missing person, which may be a going business enterprise needing
immediate and constant attention, or other property which, without proper .manage-
ment could suffer serious monetary loss or physical deterioration, and might lie un-
attended pending final determination by the Judge." SPECIAL REPORT 6.
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reasonable protection for the absentee and other interested parties.
Two requirements must be met in order to sustain the propriety of
a particular act by an appointee. First, there must be a statutory
warrant for the act;54 and secondly, if the power is of a type
which may be exercised only with specific authorization of the court,
this requisite must be complied with.
Most states authorize the appointee to take possession of the
property55 of the absentee without specific judicial authorization. 0
In addition, there are provisions authorizing, without prior judicial
approval, the collection of rents and income from the property and
debts due the absentee.57
The statutes are less liberal in sanctioning disposition of the
absentee's property or its profits, however. Many statutes explicitly
require specific judicial directives for the expenditure of funds.58
"'For example, in In re Safris, 112 F. Supp. 146 (D.NJ. 1953), the court held that
the absentee statute did not authorize the receiver to file a petition for arrangement
in bankruptcy on behalf of her absentee-husband's estate.
The court may rely on its equity power to authorize what would otherwise be
outside the statutory grant. In In re Parrett, 86 Ohio App. 162, 90 N.E.2d 425 (1949),
an objection was raised to a trustee's application for authorization to partition and
sell real estate in which the absentee held an undivided interest. The court asserted
that it was unnecessary to decide whether the trustee had the right to maintain a
statutory action in partition because "the nature of the action and the allegations
made constitute an action for equitable partition. Equitable partition is an additional
remedy to statutory partition." Id. at 164, 90 N.E.2d at 427. The court then pro-
ceeded to rule that it could authorize the partition by virtue of its equitable juris-
diction over the conduct of fiduciaries.
"r A material issue may be what constitutes "property" of the absentee. In Hanley
v. Wadleigh, 88 N.H. 174, 186 At. 505 (1936), the court held that the administrator
could not take property which had been held by the absentee as life tenant because
the validity of the administrator's appointment depended upon the belief that the
absentee was dead.
" E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 265; IDAHo CODE ANN. § 15-2108 (1948); NED. REv. STAT.
§ 156.060 (1959); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2119.03 (Page 1954).
57E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2005 (1964); Oma. RaV. STAT. § 127.060 (1953); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 4-32 (1957).
In Esson v. Flickinger, 237 Ore. 462, 391 P.2d 769 (1964), trustees sought to justify
their action in maintaining a damages suit for personal injuries suffered by the
absentee prior to disappearance citing the provision which empowered them to "collect
all debts, dues and credits owned by the missing person." The court rejected the argu-
ment, interpreting "debts" as being "generally associated with an obligation owed
under a contract." Id. at 464, 391 P.2d at 770.
58E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 265 (debts); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-710 (1961) (debts,
claims for alimony); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2119.03 (Page 1954) (debts, insurance
premiums, alimony, other obligations); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.80.040 (1956) (care,
maintenance and upkeep of the property); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4-32 (1959) (expenses
of trust and debts). Contra, N.C. GaN. STAT. § 28A-8 (Supp. 1965) (debts, insurance
premiums); ORa. REy. STAT. § 127.060 (1963) (pay expenses incident to collection of
property and debts); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1202 (b) (1950) (pay premiums on life
insurance).
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Moreover, a failure to obtain the requisite authorization may result
in a portion of the final account being disallowed, subjecting the
representative to personal loss.59 Although at least one state 0 spe-
cifically authorizes the appointee to invest property at his discretion,
most states require judicial sanction for any investment.61 The
statutory provisions relating to the sale or encumbrance of the
absentee's property are without exception in requiring judicial ap-
proval, which is often bestowed only after a hearing of which notice
has been given to parties who might be affected by the action.62
Some statutes require only that the disposition be in the "best in-
terests" of the estate and interested persons.6 3 Other states permit
sale only for purposes of making judicially authorized payments 4
and may require the personal estate to be otherwise insufficient to
satisfy the obligations.65
While reasonable latitude is necessary to allow for proper ad-
ministration, it is submitted that such restrictions on the disposition
of the absentee's property are not necessarily undue. The purpose
of the conservatorship, it should be noted, is to preserve the property
until the absentee returns or is determined dead. The property
will be distributed to the heirs in the latter event, and the duration
of the conservatorship will in most instances be no more than seven
years,66 the usual period after which death is presumed. Thus,
the property is in a conceptual limbo-the rights of the absentee,
while not divested, are fallow through lack of exercise and placed in
question by the possibility of his death. These facts, in turn, elevate
the expectations of the heirs to a level where their nascent rights
arguably should be protected. In such a situation, the consent of
both the potential heirs and the administering court should be re-
quired for disposition.
An important duty of the appointee in most states is to use the
39 Gay v. Carlstein, 262 Mass. 551, 160 N.E. 343 (1928).
00 Ky. R v. STAT. § 395A20(2) (1960).
01 E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 200, § 9 (1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.12 (1947);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-20-5 (1956).
02E.g., CAL. PROB. CoDE §§ 267-69; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 127.080-.130 (1963).
03E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 267; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2109 (1948); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 156.090 (1959). This determination is for the judiciary and a decision may be suc-
cessfully challenged only when an abuse of discretion is shown. Estate of Scott, 181
Cal. App. 2d 605, 608, 5 Cal. Rptr. 393, 395 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).04 E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2007 (1964); OHIo Rev. CODE ANN. § 2119.04 (Page
1954); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-20-2 (1957).
05 NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2007 (1964).
"See notes 92-94 infra and accompanying text.
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income of the property, or the property itself if necessary, to pro-
vide support and maintenance for those dependent on the absentee. 7
The states unanimously require judicial authorization for these
expenditures, and such provisions comport with the theory that
not only would the absentee have been likely to support his de-
pendents with his property, but also that the dependents have an
interest in the property of their own right.
At least three states have made express provision for the con-
tinuation of a business enterprise of the absentee. 8  The most
recent statute, enacted in North Carolina, typically provides that
the receiver may, with the approval of the judge, "continue to
operate and manage any business enterprise, farm or farming opera-
tions, and to make necessary contracts with reference thereto . . .
Vital questions may be asked as to the meaning of the term "busi-
ness" in these statutes. There is no indication whether it includes
only such species as the sole proprietorship, or whether the term
is broad enough to subsume a partnership, a wholly owned corpora-
tion or a partially owned corporation. There has been an indication
that the New York statute providing for the operation of a business
includes only a business which had been conducted "in individual
form" and not a corporation whether wholly or partly owned by
the absentee.70 The question is a pivotal one, and proper drafts-
manship should insure that all businesses which are in fact depen-
dent upon the absentee's supervision be sufficiently protected.
There are several provisions enabling the appointee to bring
117 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-87 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2109 (1948);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-8 (9) (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1202 (1950)
(expenditure for the support of anyone whom the absentee would be under a legal
duty to support or for education of his minor children); UNIFORM ABSENCE AS EVI-
DENCE oF DEATH AND AnsENTEs' PROPERTY ACT § 3 (2).
08 N.Y. SuRR. Cr. ACT § 127 (pending sale of business or where surrogate finds
continued operation to be in best interests of the estate); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-8 (5)
(Supp. 1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 127.060 (1963) (operate the property if operation
is advisable).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-8 (5) (Supp. 1965).
70 1n dictum, the court in In re Dix's Will, 34 Misc. 2d 421, 226 N.Y.S.2d 111
(Surr. Ct. 1962), said that "the provision refers to a business conducted by the de-
cedent or absentee, and has no reference to any business conducted by a corporation,
whether such corporation be wholly or partly owned by the decedent or absentee.
The sense of the amendment is to empower the court to authorize a temporary
administrator to continue the operation of any business which was conducted by
the decedent or absentee in individual form." Id. at 428, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 118. The
case involved a temporary administrator which had been appointed for a decedent.
He was, however, acting under the same statutory authority which is vested in a
temporary administrator appointed for an absentee.
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or defend suits on behalf of the absentee. The provisions may be
phrased in blanket terms, presumably enabling the representative
to sue or defend in all types of actions otherwise permitted by law 1
Other less sagacious statutes limit the right to a representative suit
to those actions necessary to collect or protect the property of the
absentee.7 2 A few states require specific authorization for the pur-
pose of compromising claims and debts in behalf of or against the
absentee.7 3 Arguably, however, the conservator should be afforded
relatively great latitude in the above situations, since the statute of
limitations may otherwise bar just claims of both the absentee and
his creditors. Such provisions should at least allow judicial au-
thorization for suits when necessary to protect the interests of
creditors or the absentee.
The Uniform Act74 and statutes in three states75 wisely provide
that courts may direct or approve the expenditure of funds by the
appointee in search for the absentee. In North Carolina, the court
must direct the receiver to make a search for the absentee,7 6 and
the statute also prescribes certain minimum measures which are to
be taken in the course of the inquiry.77
711E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 395.420 (1960) (a curator may sue and be sued); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-8 (3) (Supp. 1965) (the permanent receiver shall, under the direction
of the judge, bring and defend suits); UNIFORM ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND
ABSENTEES' PROPERTY ACT § 3 (2) (the receiver shall, under the direction of the Court,
bring and defend suits).
72 E.g., N.Y. SuRu. Cr. Aar § 127, which allows suit for purposes of taking into
possession and preserving personal property, collecting choses in action, and deter-
mining title to personal property in the representative's possession. He may be sued
upon a debt or any other action which could be maintained against an administrator-
in-chief. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2308 (1958) (suit proper to protect the property
or rights of absentee).
3 D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-711 (1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2108 (1948); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 200, § 11 (1955).
74 UNIFORM ABSENCE As EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY ACT § 5.
76 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-20-7 (1963); N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT. § 131; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1205 (1950).
70 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-9 (Supp. 1965).
77 "The order may prescribe any methods of search deemed advisable by the judge,
but must require, as a minimum, the following:
"(1) Inquiry of persons at the absentee's home, his last known residence, the place
where he was last known to have been, and other places where information would
likely be obtained or where the absentee would likely have gone;
"(2) Inquiry of relatives, friends and associates of the absentee, or other persons
who should be most likely to hear from or of him;
"(3) Insertion of a notice in one or more appropriate papers, periodicals or other
news media requesting information from any person having knowledge of the ab-
sentee's whereabouts; and
"(4) Notification of local, state and national offices which should be most likely
to know or learn of the absentee's whereabouts." Ibid.
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Despite the specificity with which the appointee's powers may
be delineated, no draftsman is so omniscient as to foresee all the
problems of administration which may arise. To provide for such
unexpected contingencies, the North Carolina act included a novel
provision enabling the judge "in his discretion, by written order [to]
modify, add to or subtract from the statutory powers granted .... 18
Such a provision assures that the authority granted is sufficiently
flexible to cover the diverse situations which may be presented,
and would clearly appear to be a desirable complement to absentee
statutes.
PROTECTION FOR ABSENTEE
One source of built-in protection for the absentee is the panoply
of limitations placed upon the appointee's authority to act on his
behalf. As indicated earlier, specific judicial authorization must
often be obtained for a particular act. 9 This is especially true
with respect to disbursements of the absentee's property. Also,
bonds must be posted in most states,80 and may, in the court's dis-
cretion, be required in others, conditioned on the conservator's
obedience to court orders and proper accounting for all property
in the estate."'
In addition, many of the limitations typically imposed upon
normal trustees are likewise required of the generically related
conservator. For example, almost all states have provisions relating
to the filing by the conservator of periodic reports with the court.8 2
Further, a final accounting on termination of the conservatorship
or on the termination of the appointee's tenure as conservator is
explicitly ordered by some states88 and would presumably be re-
quired in all cases.84 Removal of the fiduciary for adequate cause
78 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-8 (Supp. 1965).
79 See notes 58, 61-70, 73-78 supra and accompanying text.
80 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 113-2703 (1959); Ky. REv. STAT. § 395.410(3) (1960).
81 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 4102 (1953); HAWAi REv. LAWS § 338-22 (1955);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2106 (1948); R.. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-20-4 (1956).
82 In most states, the necessity and frequency of reporting is discretionary with the
court. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 4102 (1953); HAWAu REv. LAws § 338-22 (1955).
In a few states, however, reports must be submitted at designated frequencies. E.g.,
ORE. REv. STAT. § 127.140 (1963) (first Monday in April and first Monday in October
of each year); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.80.030 (1956) (annually and as judge may
require).83E.g., OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2119.05 (Page 1954); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.80.060
(1956).
" Cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Lindholm, 66 F.2d 56, 59 (9th Cir. 1933).
[Vol. 1966: 745
PROPERTY LAW
and reappointment of another is expressly provided for in only about
one-fifth of the states. s5 However, the Massachusetts court has indi-
cated that such power inheres in the supervisory power of equity
over fiduciaries, stating in dictum that this authority is "inherent
in the ... Court, and necessarily incidental to the accomplishment
of the purposes of the statute .... ,,86
TERMINATION
Most statutes provide for the termination of the conservatorship
on the occurrence of certain enumerated events, although a few
states make no such provision expressly. Commonly, the conservator-
ship is terminated on the return of the absentee8 7 or on the presen-
tation of a power of attorney executed by the absentee and authoriz-
ing the agent so empowered to supervise the property.88 If an
executor or administrator is appointed to distribute the estate
of the absentee, the court will terminate the conservatorship and
direct the conservator to transfer the remaining property to the
personal representative.8 9 It is presumed that the conservatorship
would also terminate if judicially authorized payments to depen-
dents9" should consume all of the property. Only one statute, how-
ever, expressly provides for termination on this eventuality.91
Part II. MACHINERY FOR DETERMINATION OF DEATH AND
ULTIMATE DISTRIBUTION
Because the newly enacted North Carolina statute appears to
prescribe the most novel and satisfactory plan yet devised for
distributing the property of an absentee, that statute will serve as a
basis for discussion in Part II. The more conventional schemes of
85E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-87 (1960); NEV. REV. STAT. § 156.070 (1959);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-32 (1957).
So Webster v. Franklin County Trust Co., 313 Mass. 401, 404, 47 N.E.2d 934, 936
(1943); see note 2 supra.
37 E.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 395.420(2) (1960); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2008 (1964); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 156.100 (1959).
8"E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. 33-20-10 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. 75-1-11 (1953);
WASH. REv. CODE 11.80.070 (1956).
soE.g., D.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-712 (1961) (termination on the appointment of an
administrator, executor, assignee in insolvency, or trustee in bankruptcy); FL.A. STAT.
§ 747.04 (1963); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 338-23 (1955).
Because some receiverships are designed for purposes of both conservatorship
and ultimate distribution, the "conservator" may himself be the party to make
the final distribution. E.g., N.C GEN. STAT. § 28A-13 (Supp. 1965).
"See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
91 OA. REV. STAT. § 127.190 (1963).
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distribution are discussed as they depart from the North Carolina
plan.
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH VERSUS STATUTE OF LIMITATION
A majority of states allow application for letter of administra-
tion when the absentee has been absent for the statutory or common
law presumption of death period. Although in most states this
period is seven years,92 the time may vary from five 93 to thirty
years.94 A few states, however, allow a distribution of the absentee's
estate upon the lapse of a specified period of limitation. As op-
posed to a presumption of death, such a statute of limitation ap-
roach assumes neither the life nor the death of the absentee.
Rather, the absentee will be barred from any interest in his prop-
erty after failing to reappear for a stated time, and the fact that he
later returns alive will not operate to revest his title. 5 These two
approaches, although often leading to similar results, rest upon
divergent conceptual and operational bases, and their relative
efficacy will be explored below.
The use of presumptions of death in absentee statutes has
been severely criticized as an anacronism in modern law.96 Thus,
Professor Wigmore has argued that the presumption does not meet
the problems posed by the case of a missing person. Wigmore con-
tends that "it uses an ancient rule-of-thumb (seven years) which
92 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 156 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1701 (1953);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2121.01 (Page 1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 120.310 (1963); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64-101 (1953).
93 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-1601 (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-2301 (1953); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 919 (1958).
91 LA. CIV. CODE art. 70 (Slovenko 1961).
95 See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 280, 284; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 200, § 13 (1955);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.16 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1913 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-11 (c) (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1201 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.80.080-.100 (1956).
A statute of limitations approach is not based on the state's power to administer
decedents' estates but is rather justifiable as an exercise of the state's police power in
the public interest. See Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911). Several states have these
statutes of limitation but, in addition, rely on the common law presumption of death.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-501, 20-712 to -713 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 268.22
(1957) (interpretive commentary).
It should be noted that the Wisconsin statute preserves the common law pre-
sumption of death by omitting section one of the Uniform Act which abolished the
presumption of death, UNIFORM ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEs'
PROPERTY ACT § 1. However, since a finding of death is no longer necessary to dis-
tribute an absentee's estate, the retention of the presumption will be of little im-
portance.
9' See 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2531 (b) (3d ed. 1940).
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has no relation to the facts of human experience in modem condi-
tions."97 Furthermore, "it applies a single rule to different situations
which should require different treatment." 98 There are at least
four such situations in which a presumption of death may be
employed: (1) when the absentee's spouse desires to remarry; (2)
when an heir at law desires the distribution of the absentee's estate;
(3) when a beneficiary makes claim on a life insurance policy on
the life of an absentee; and (4) when the vesting of a remainder
or a reversion depends upon the death of the absentee. Each of
these instances have different problems and Wigmore concludes
that they must be kept distinct in legislation99 in order to adequately
treat the peculiar considerations involved.
It has also been argued that the common law presumption period
of seven years is far too long. Conditions of communication, travel,
and search have changed radically since the time of the presump-
tion's adoption. Wigmore suggests that "the circumstances of each
case should be the basis for decision, and there should be no fixed
or universal rule"'100 which has neither logic nor convenience to
justify it.
The substance of these criticisms inveighs against a rigid appli-
cation of either the presumption or the limitation approach. Wig-
more's suggestions have largely been ignored, however. Only a few
states besides North Carolina and those states adopting the Uni-
form Act'01 make the determination of death for purposes of dis-
tributing an absentee's estate an issue apart from any presumption or
operation of law arising from absence for a period of time. 0 2 The
17Id. § 2531 (b), at 470-71. For example, such an arbitrary rule would not seem
capable of application with equal validity to an absentee who on the one hand is a
fugitive from justice and is known to have recently taken a large sum of money from
his bank account and on the other to a person who was on board a ship lost at sea
with no survivors having ever been found.
9s.Id. § 2531 (b), at 471.
0"Id. § 2531 (b), at 471-74.100 Id. § 2531 (b), at 472. (Italicized as in original.)
101 UNIFORMf ABSENCE As EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY Aar § 8.
Although proposed in 1939, only three states have adopted the Uniform Act.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 200-12 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1801 to -1815 (1955);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 268.22-.34 (1957).
102 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-20-4 (1963) (court may make a finding of death at
any time during the trusteeship and judicially determine the date of death, provided
the required notice is given); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1201 (1950) (court may
conduct a hearing at any time after commencement of absence and upon "satisfactory
evidence" may find the absentee dead and fix the date of death); TEXAS PROB. CODE
§ 72 (Supp. 1965) (court authorized to grant letters of administration upon the estate
of an absentee when his death shall be proved by circumstantial evidence).
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North Carolina statute0 3 abrogates the common law doctrine of
seven years' presumption of death for the purposes of the act and
superimposes an eclectic and ingenious mechanism for distribution
which is designed to comport with and take cognizance of factual
reality. This statute is the most recent and radical departure from
traditional concepts, and will be explored at length below.
The North Carolina statute provides for three alternative de-
crees which terminate the receivership established for the purpose
of conservation and management,104 and the act also makes pro-
vision for the distribution or return of the absentee's property.'
0 5
In order to make such a disposition effectively, this section provides
for a final determination of the status of the absentee. Thus, sub-
section (a) prescribes that at any time during the existence of the
receivership an interested party may apply for a final hearing.100
This hearing is to be conducted as would any civil suit and upon
presentation of satisfactory evidence of the absentee's death, a
jury, or a judge sitting without a jury, 07 may make a final finding
and decree that the absentee is dead. 08 The transcript of the pro-
10O N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-1 (Supp. 1965).
104 The statute provides for (1) the appointment of a permanent receiver to con-
serve the absentee's property, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-6 (Supp. 1965); (2) the specific
duties of the receiver, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-8 (Supp. 1965); and (3) the transfer of
the absentee's property to the receiver, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-7 (Supp. 1965).
105 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13 (Supp. 1965).
200N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-11 (a) (Supp. 1965). Although the statute never sped-
fies who is an interested party for this purpose, § 28A-4, providing for notice to in-
terested persons, provides that notice shall be addressed to "all persons who would
have an interest in the estate of such absentee if he were deceased, [and] to all
persons alleged in the complaint to claim an interest in the absentee's property ......
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-4 (Supp. 1965). Similarly, § 28A-2 (c), specifying who are to be
parties to an action for a receiver, provides that "all persons who would have an
interest in the estate of such absentee if he were deceased, all persons known to
claim an interest in the absentee's property, and all known insurers of the life of the
absentee shall be made parties to the action." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2 (c) (Supp. 1965).
"" The filing of an application for a final hearing by an interested party is in
effect a motion that the case be docketed for trial on the issue of the absentee's
status. This issue is to be determined as would an issue of fact in any civil case.
Therefore, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-172 (1953), the issue must be tried by a jury
unless a trial by jury is waived at which time the issue will be triable to the judge.
105 Subsection (b) of § 28A-1 provides that in determining the fact of death upon
the evidence, exposure to a "specific peril of death" is to be explicitly considered by
the judge and, if there is a jury, it shall be sufficient evidence to submit the issue
to the jury. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-I (b) (Supp. 1965). It must be noted that this is
not an exclusive rule and a determination of death may arise under circumstances
inconsistent with life even though there is no showing of exposure to specific peril.
Upon the entry of such a final finding, § 28A-12 (1) provides that the judge shall
wind up the receivership and terminate the proceedings by: (1) "satisfying all out-
[Vol. 1966: 745
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ceedings will then be certified to the Clerk of the Superior Court,
who administers the estate of the absentee as that of a decedent. 10D
If the court or jury determines that sufficient evidence of death has
not been presented, the receivership merely continues.
Provision is likewise made for termination and distribution in
the event that the absentee should reappear or his presence becomes
known. Subsection (b) provides that at any time during the re-
ceivership any party in interest may apply to the judge for a find-
ing that the absentee is still alive." 0 After hearing the evidence,
the court may find as a matter of fact that the absentee is living and
return his property to him."'
Subsection (c) provides for the ultimate termination of the
receivership even though there has been no finding of either the
death or continued existence of the absentee.1 2 After a lapse of
five years," 3 the judge may call for a final hearing and take evidence
as to whether or not the absentee should be barred from any interest
in his property because of his failure to appear." 4 Subsection (c) is
standing expenses and costs of the receivership"; (2) deducting a stated percentage
for the absentee insurance fund, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-12 (1) (Supp. 1965); (3) re-
quiring the receiver's account, discharging him and his bondsman upon approval
thereof, and entering a final decree of termination, N.C. GrEN. STAT. § 28A-12 (4)
(Supp. 1965).
209 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-11 (a) (Supp. 1965).
X1 0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-11 (b) (Supp. 1965).
"'When there is such a revocation of the finding that the missing person is an
absentee, § 28A-12 (2) provides that the judge shall terminate the proceedings by:
(1) "satisfying all outstanding expenses and costs of the receivership"; (2) returning
the remaining property to the absentee and rendering an accounting for the property
not returned, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-12 (2) (Supp. 1965); and (3) requiring the re-
ceiver's final account discharging him and his bondsman, and entering a final decree
of termination, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-12 (4) (Supp. 1965).
"'
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-11 (c) (Supp. 1965).
11" Section 28A-14 provides for an alternative period of limitation. If at the time
a receiver is appointed it is found that the absentee has been missing for four years,
the period of limitation "shall be not less than two years after the date of the ap-
pointment of the permanent receiver instead of the five years .... " N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-14 (Supp. 1965).
Some of the states basing distribution on a statute of limitation have similar
provisions, presumably to furnish the most expeditious and equitable settlement pos-
sible. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 200, § 13 (1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.16
(1947).
1 14
"[T]he judge may [then] decree that the absentee has lost all interest in his
property and that the right to such property has devolved upon others by reason of
his failure to appear." SPECIAL REPORT 15.
It would seem that the statute is deficient in this respect, for there is no indica-
tion as to the nature or significance of the further evidence to be taken. Likewise,
there is no indication as to whether the judge must call for a final hearing. If he
chooses to stay a final hearing or, upon hearing, refuses to decree that the absentee
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clearly a statute of limitation, based on the police power of the state
and assuming neither the life nor the death of the absentee."15
The validity and efficacy of such a provision are apparent. As to
the former, the Supreme Court in Blinn v. Nelson"O recognized
the constitutional power of a state to provide by legislation for the
preservation of an absentee's estate for a reasonable time and to
designate a period of limitation at the expiration of which he must
appear or lose all interest in his property.1 7 Further, it is arguable
that on policy grounds a statute of limitation which bars one's claim
to his property when it is not asserted within a reasonable time is
not unfair. It is generally understood that one is subject to the
loss of his property through failure to pay the taxes assessed upon
it or by virtue of its adverse possession for a specified period of time.
Missing persons are at least as debilitating to the stability of title
as are such ascertainable claimants and if they neglect to safeguard
their own property, they should have no right to have it protected
indefinitely or until they decide to return. 1 8
Similarly, the North Carolina provision appears to have met the
objections interposed against a rigid application of a presumption
will be barred, the conservatorship could presumably remain in operation indefinitely.
See 1942 Wis. L. REv. 280, 282.
Following a decree of devolution, the judge is to terminate the proceedings under
§ 28A-12 (3) by: (1) "satisfying all outstanding expenses and costs of the receivership";
(2) "satisfying all outstanding taxes, other debts, and charges"; (3) deducting for the
absentee insurance fund; (4) transferring and distributing the remaining property,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-12 (8) (Supp. 1965); and (5) requiring an accounting from and
upon approval thereof, discharging the receiver, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-12 (4) (Supp.
1965). Section 28A-15 specifically provides that an absentee cannot bring an action
for the recovery of his property after a final finding or decree has been made, although
he may be reimbursed under an insurance provision included in the statute. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-15 (Supp. 1965). See notes 178-86 infra and accompanying text.
12r See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
1 0222 U.S. 1 (1911).
"I7 Id. at 7. The Blinn case involved a Massachusetts statute which provided that if
the absentee did not appear to claim the property within fourteen years after the
appointment of a receiver, his title would be barred. Also, if the receiver is not
appointed within thirteen years from the date of disappearance, the time for
distribution and barring actions will be one year after the appointment of the re-
ceiver instead of fourteen years. Id. at 2. The question posed to the Court was
whether a statute of limitations that might possibly run for only one year was
invalid. The Court asserted that "if the legislature thinks that a year is long enough
to allow a party to recover his property from a third hand, and establishes that time
in cases where he has not been heard of for fourteen years and presumably is dead it
acts within its constitutional discretion. . . . [I]n the great majority of instances no
doubt justice will be done." Id. at 7. See also Beckwith v. Bates, 228 Mich. 400, 200
N.W. 151 (1924).
118 American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 62 (1911). See Lees, Property Rights
of Persons Who Have Disappeared, 9 MINN. L. REv. 89, 99 (1925).
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or limitation-type statute. It would appear that criticism of a pre-
sumption of death period is valid only when leveled at a naked pre-
sumption unaccompanied by a provision for the binding factual
determination of death before the presumptive period has run. 19
Although application of a presumption in all cases would often
lead to arbitrary and unjust results, instances will arise when neither
death nor continued life can be shown or even said to have the
greater probability. In such instances the presumption serves a
useful purpose, for it will be necessary to distribute the estate at
some time in the future and this will necessarily be an arbitrary
date. The length of time chosen as a waiting period before distribu-
tion, rather than the form of the provision, will to a great extent
determine its ability to meet such problems. In terms of practical
result, there is no distinction between constructing this period in the
form of a five-year presumption of death and doing so in the form
of a five-year statute of limitations. The real difference between
the more enlightened modern legislation and the old presumption
of death statutes is the supplementary provisions employed in
the former. It would seem that in the modern statutes both the
presumption of death and the statute of limitations are theoretically
predicated upon the reasoning that property has been abandoned
and it is promotive of the general welfare of society and certain
third parties that this property be finally distributed. Either form
purports to be binding on the absentee, and if they provide for an
earlier determination of death and yet are constitutional because
they have made provision for protection of the absentee's interests,
have given him notice and afforded a reasonable period of time
in which to return and claim his property,120 they are of equal suffi-
ciency in dealing with the problems involved.
The most serious fault to be found in the use of a statute of
limitations for the distribution of an absentee's property is that
since death is not in issue, the date of death will not be dispositively
determined. However, under all absentee statutes, the date by ref-
erence to which heirs, next of kin or insurance beneficiaries are
to be determined is pivotal to a distribution to the proper parties.
The Uniform Act failed to meet this problem when it provided
that distribution is to be made as of the date determined by the
119See N.C. GN. STAT. § 28A-11 (a) (Supp. 1965).
' .oSee Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 476-77 (1905).
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court in its final finding,' 21 for there is no indication of what cri-
teria are to be used in fixing such a date in the event that the final
finding is not based upon a factual determination of death.122 The
North Carolina act remedies this situation by specifically providing
that the absentee's estate is to be distributed "as though .. . [he]
died . . . on the day five years after the date of his disappear-
ance .... ",123 It is to be noted that this provision does not fix the
time of death, but it does solve the problem of identifying the
correct distribution date by simply providing a point in time with
reference to which all rights are to be determined. Surprisingly,
statutes based on a presumption of death are no more successful
in escaping the date-of-death problem. Although death is an issue
under such a statute, the majority rule is that the presumption re-
lates only to the fact of death and not to the time of death. 124 While
courts adhering to the majority rule will allow the submission of
evidence which tends to show that the date of death in fact occurred
before the expiration of the presumptive period,' 25 the problem of
determining the distributees remains if the requisite evidence can-
not be found. At least three presumption of death statutes have
attempted to solve this problem with provisions fixing an actual
date of death. 2 6
REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS
(1) Reasonable period of time
Cunnius v. Reading School Dist.,2 7 in upholding the states'
power to pass special absentee statutes as within the permissible
2
2 1 UNIFORm ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY Aar § 9.
122 See 1942 Wis. L. REV. 280, 282.
123 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13 (Supp. 1965).
12, See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 143 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1944); Griffin v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 250 Mich. 185, 229 N.W. 509 (1930); Heffort v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 Ore. 353, 144 P.2d 695 (1944); 9 WMoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 2531 (a) (3d ed. 1940); 38 COLUm. L. REV. 322, 325 (1938); 3 RuTGEms L. RPv. 266,
268 (1949).
A minority of the states hold that the passing of a specified period of time raises
a presumption which both fixes the fact of death and the time of death at the end of the
period. See In re Chicago 9- N.W. Ry. Co., 138 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1943); Thompson
v. Pamet, 82 Ohio App. 366, 78 N.E.2d 419 (1948); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2531 (a)
(3d ed. 1940); 3 RTrrEs L. REV. 266, 268 (1949).
125 See cases cited note 124 supra.
120 IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-2302 (1953) (presumed to have died on the first day of his
disappearance); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (335) (1962) (presumed to have died seven
years from the date of his disappearance); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1201 (b) (1950)
(presumed to have died seven years from the time last heard of.
121 198 U.S. 458 (1905). See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text. In this case
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ambit of the due process clause, asserted that such statutes must
afford the absentee a reasonable length of time after an action to
divest him of title has been brought in which to return and claim
his property.128 In light of the modern methods of transportation,
communication and search, and taking note of the periods deemed
reasonable in other states, 129 the five-year period in North Caro-
lina30 would appear to be sufficient although by necessity arbitrary.
It must be noted that the factual finding of death under section
28A-11 (a), contrary to the statute of limitation contained in section
28A-11 (c), may be made at any time during the receivership, and
yet both sections are equally binding on the absentee. It is ques-
tionable whether a reasonable time has been insured the absentee
in the former circumstance should he in fact be alive and return.'3 '
the defendant assumed a debt owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then disappeared
and was missing for a year. Under the applicable seven-year presumption of death
statute in force in Pennsylvania, plaintiff's son applied for and was granted letters of
administration on his father's estate. Pursuant to his duties the administrator col-
lected interest on the debt from defendant and gave him a receipt and discharge in
return. The plaintiff then returned and sued defendant for the same interest. Id. at
460-61. The court held that the state could constitutionally enact the statute in
question in the exercise of its police power. However, the court placed limitations on
this power by conceding that if the statute were "an arbitrary and unreasonable pre-
sumption of death resulting from absence for a brief period . . . did not provide
adequate notice as prerequisite to the proceedings for the administration of the
estate ... [and] contained no adequate safeguards concerning property.. ." the statute
would be repugnant to the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 476-77.1 28 Id. at 477. The Court did not attempt to define what period would afford the
absentee a reasonable length of time in which to return and claim his property. The
statute in question employed a seven-year presumption of death. As to this period
of time the Court noted that "it certainly cannot be said to be unreasonable." Ibid.
120 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-199 (1960) (five-year period); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 7-2306 (1953) (three-year period); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (335) (1962)
(three-year period); ORE. REv. STAT. § 120.370 (1963) (five-year period). See also
3linn v. Nelson, where it was held that the legislature of Massachusetts acted within
its constitutional discretion when it provided that the absentee had one year in which
to appear and recover his property when he had been missing for thirteen years before
a receiver was appointed.
120 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-11 (c) (Supp. 1965).
131 Under the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2 (Supp. 1965), a temporary
receiver may be appointed thirty days after the absentee's disappearance. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28A-3 (Supp. 1965) requires that within thirty days of his appointment, the
temporary receiver shall file an inventory of all the property he has taken in charge.
Further, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-4 (Supp. 1965) provides that upon the filing of this
inventory, notice shall be sent to interested persons of the hearing for a permanent
receiver. The return day of the notice may be as few as thirty days and no more
than sixty days subsequent to its issuance. When notice is returned, a permanent re-
ceivership may be established and at any time subsequent to its establishment, a deter-
mination of death may be rendered. It is thus conceivable that the absentee could be
declared dead and barred from all his property rights under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-15
(Supp. 1965) after the period of ninety days.
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(2) Notice
Cunnius also requires that the statute "provide adequate notice
as prerequisite to the proceedings for the administration of the
estate of an absentee."' 32 It is unfortunate that the Court did not
specify in detail what would be considered "adequate" notice. Pub-
lication of notice is usually provided for in the statutes,' 33 and such
notice prefatory to distribution was deemed reasonable by the
Cunnius Court. 3 4 Many states require notice to be directed to the
absentee to show satisfactory evidence of his continued life.33 It is
significant that under the North Carolina statute, notice need only
be given before the hearing for appointment of a permanent re-
ceiver 136 and need not be given again at the time of the final finding
and decree, 137 or the point at which the absentee's property rights
are finally and irrevocably barred. 38 It is believed that, if tested,
the statute would be held constitutional in light of Blinn v. Nel-
son, which did not appear to base the validity of the absentee
statute in question on the presence of technical publication notice
which will give little practical protection. The question framed
there was simply whether the procedure followed was fair and reason-
ably appropriate to cope with a problem within the proper scope
of state legislation. 39
132 198 U.S. at 477.
133 See Committee on Administration of Property of Infants, Incompetents and
Missing Persons, Report, 102 TRUSTS & ESTAThS 908 (1963).
13 198 U.S. at 176-77.
185 See, e.g., A.A. CoDE tit. 61, § 159 (1960) ("said notice shall require the sup-
posed decedent, if alive, or any person for him, to produce . . . satisfactory evidence
of his continuance in life'); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-703 (1961) ("the court may issue a
notice ...which shall be addressed to such absentee and to all persons who claim
of record an interest in said property ... citing them to appear ... and show cause
why a receiver . . .should not be appointed . . .'); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-2603 (1959)
("said notice shall require the supposed decedent, if alive, or any person for him, to
produce .. . satisfactory evidence of his continuance in life").13 0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-4 to -5 (Supp. 1965).
2
3 7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-11 (Supp. 1965).
138 See American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 63 (1911); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950) (dictum).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-4 (Supp. 1965) provides that notice prior to establishment
of receivership shall issue addressed to the absentee, to all persons who would have
an interest in his property, and to all whom it may concern. The statute further
provides that the absentee shall be served by publication for four weeks in a news-
paper in the county where the proceeding is pending, shall be sent notice by
registered or certified mail to his last known address, and shall have notice posted
on each parcel of land subject to the proceedings. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-5 (Supp.
1965).
189 1942 Wis. L. Rxv. 280, 290.
Although there is no express language to this effect, this interpretation is ccr-
tainly to be inferred from the Court's decision. After establishing that the pro-
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(3) Protection of the absentee
The states have also devised various procedures in an effort to
meet the third requirement called for by Cunnius v. Reading School
Dist., protection of the absentee's interest should he in fact be
alive. 40 Some have seen fit to provide for the absentee's recovery
of his estate if he should return at any time in the future.'4 ' At
the other end of the spectrum, several states provide for the tolling
of a statute of limitations at the end of which time the property is
distributed and the absentee is barred from any claim to his estate.1'
A number of states provide a period of time, usually twelve weeks, 43
between the presentation of evidence sufficient to satisfy a presump-
tion of death and the granting of letters of administration, within
which time evidence of continued life must be presented to pre-
vent distribution.' 44 Another common provision is one which al-
lows provisional distribution or provides for a holding period at
the time letters are granted with final distribution being made after
the passing of a given period of time. 45
Regardless of when distribution of the absentee's estate is made,
courts in some states require the distributees, to furnish a secured
bond conditioned on their refunding the property or its value if the
absentee should return or if he is later proved to have been alive at
the time of distribution. 46 The bond may have perpetual valid-
visions in question were within the scope of a proper state function, the Court said
that "there is reasonably careful provision for notice by publication before the ap-
pointment [of a receiver] and the whole proceeding begins with a seizure by the
sheriff of the property mentioned in the original petition." 222 U.S. at 6-7. (Emphasis
added.) See 1942 Wis. L. REv. 280, 289-90.
.240 198 U.S. at 477.
141 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2122 (c) (Supp. 1965) (if the "alleged decedent
is not dead, he may . . . at any time recover the estate . . .'); Mss. CODE ANN. § 1698
(1956) ("but any property or estate recovered in any such case shall be restored to
the person evicted or deprived thereof, if, in a subsequent action, it shall be proved
that the person so presumed to be dead is living").
142 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 200, § 12 (1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.15
(1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-15 (Supp. 1965). The Massachusetts provision was held
constitutional in Blinn v. Nelson, it being a statute of limitation which the Court
found reasonable.
143 FLA. STAT. § 734.35 (1963) (absentee is given three months in which to show
evidence of continued life); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-2603 (1959) (same).
144 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 160 (1960); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2121.04 (Page
1954); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-106 (1950).
140 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-20-6(4) (three years); Mici. CoMp. LAws
§ 705.10 (1948) (one year if bond posted, three years if no bond is posted); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 553:18 (1955) (five years).
146 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-2306 (1953); ORE. REv. STAT. § 120.370 (1963); IV.
VA. CODE ANN. § 4243 (1961).
It is generally provided that if the distributee cannot provide security, his share
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ity147 or it may be cancelled and the absentee barred at the end of a
period of time varying from three 4 to thirty years. 149
The rights of an absentee who returns before being barred from
claim to his estate are not uniform. He may be allowed to do one
or more of the following: recover all undistributed property,'5 0
recover distributed property,15' receive the profits from his estate
with interest accrued during the time his estate was held by dis-
tributees,152 require an accounting,153 be substituted as a party in
pending actions, and reopen judgments rendered against the ad-
ministrator of his estate. 54
It has been suggested that the most satisfactory solution to the
problem of administering the estate of an absentee is to make ulti-
mate distribution the last act in a receivership proceeding initiated
for the preservation of the estate and the support of dependents. 55
By allowing the statute of limitations to run contemporaneously
with and terminate simultaneously with the receivership, North
Carolina and other states' 56 have avoided the problems and compli-
cations incident to the necessity of requiring provisional distribu-
tion, holding periods and bond. Further, these states have suc-
cessfully met the due process requirements of reasonable time and
adequate protection of the absentee's interests.
The North Carolina statute' 57 provides an additional, novel and
effective approach to the problem of protection of the absentee.
The statute authorizes the creation of an insurance fund to be
financed by the deduction of five per cent of the absentee's estate' 8
of the estate will be transferred to a trustee who will invest the property and pay
over the earnings to him until such time as security can be given or the bond
would have been cancelled if it had been given at the time of distribution. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-199 (1960); DrL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1708 (1953).
""See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.713 (1956); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2121.08
(Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1203 (1950).
148 NEy. Rav. STAT. § 156.220 (1959).
1,9 LA. Civ. CODE arts. 65, 68 (Slovenko 1961).
150 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 271.
151 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 161 (1960); COLO. RV. STAT. ANN. § 153-20-6 (4)
(1963) (recovery except from good faith purchaser for value).
152 See, e.g., Aiuz. Rtv. STAT. ANN. § 12-509 (1956).
'
5 3 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-712 (1961); NEB. RFV. STAT. § 30-2008 (1964).
a See, e.g., ORE. R V. STAT. § 120.390 (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-110 (1950).
See Legislation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 485, 488 (1930); 2 INTRAMURAL L. Rv, 107, 111
(1947).
15' See statutes cited note 101 supra.
157 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-19 (Supp. 1965).
15s It is provided that the five per cent shall be deducted from "the total value of
the property remaining for distribution upon settlement of the absentee's estate,
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at the time of distribution and the depositing of such amount with
the state treasurer to be invested and retained. If at any time the
absentee should return and appear personally before the treasurer,
the jurisdiction of the Superior Court may be invoked to order
payment to him of an amount from the fund which the court finds
is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. 159 In making such a
determination, the court is to take into account "the disposition
made of his property, the reasons for his absence and other relevant
factors."160
An absentee insurance fund has several significant advantages
over the more common requirements of provisional distribution
with posted security. Should the absentee return at any time, he is
assured of some compensation from the insurance fund, whereas
under most bond provisions his entire claim will eventually be
barred. Such a fund obviates the difficulty that a distributee may
encounter in providing and securing a bond and, additionally, pro-
tects the distributee from a possible loss of the property he has
received.' 6 ' Because the absentee receives only the amount that
the court chooses to tender him and not the entire value of his
estate, there is a very limited inducement to fraud in such a pro-
vision .0 2 Furthermore, it would appear that the deduction from
the absentee's estate would be so insignificant in most cases that
it would result in little discomfort to the distributees 63
Only those states adopting the Uniform Absence as Evidence
of Death and Absentees' Property Act 64 have similar absentee in-
including amounts paid to the estate from policies of insurance on the absentee's
life .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-12 (1), (3) (Supp. 1965).
19 This action must be brought within three years after the absentee's return.
In the case of "infancy or other disability recognized by law," the action must be
begun within one year from the removal of the disability. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-19 (d)
(Supp. 1965).
21 0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-19 (c) (Supp. 1965).
101 See Legislation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 322, 335 & n.69 (1938).
162 If the returning absentee were allowed to recover the full value of his estate
instead of being limited to the amount the court chooses to give him, "simply by
disappearing for a number of years, a person, in collusion with his heirs, could
secure both the distribution of his property to them, and its money value for him-
self." Id. at 335.1 03 Bohrer, Life, Disappearance and Death, 39 CI. B. REc. 199, 204 (1958).
It should be noted that Tennessee, one of the few states having an insurance pro-
vision, has provided that twenty-five per cent of the total value of the absentee's
property remaining, including amounts obtained from life insurance policies, is to be
deducted for the insurance fund. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1810 (1955). Rather than
being insignificant, this amount would seem quite substantial.
16' UNIFORM ABsENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATII AND ABsENTEEs' PROPERTY Acr § 11.
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surance provisions. 0 5 However, the North Carolina act has made
several significant additions to the Uniform Act. First, it provides
for insurance fund protection established at the time when the
property has been distributed, irrespective of whether the distribu-
tion was based on a finding of death based on circumstantial evidence
or a finding of -unexplained absence for five years.' 6 The Uniform
Act insurance fund, on the other hand, only provides protection in
the latter situation.0 7 Constitutional questions aside,0 8 it would ap-
pear that an absentee should never be completely barred from all
recovery. The danger that his estate will be maladministered and the
possibility that he will eventually return are both foreseeable con-
tingencies however clear the circumstantial evidence may be. 09
The North Carolina act also diverges from similar insurance
schemes in that it allows the treasurer to change the rate to be
charged for the insurance fund "from time to time" on the basis of
actuarial experience. 70 The Uniform Act contains no such pro-
vision.' 71 It has been suggested that an insurance fund could be
utilized most effectively if it contained a rate schedule contingent
upon such factors as the circumstances of the disappearance, the
165 MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 210 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1810 (1955); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 268.81 (1957), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 268.31 (Supp. 1966).
1164 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-12 (1) (b), (3) (c) (Supp. 1965).
2"T UNIFORM ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY Aar § 8 (2) (b).
"In each case of termination of receivership as provided in Section 8, the Court,
except in cases where the proceedings have been certified to the probate Court under
Subdivision 1, Section 6 [a finding of death], shall set aside the sum there named and
direct its payment by the receiver, to the [treasurer] of the State." UNIFORM ABSENCE AS
EVmENE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY AcT § 11 (1).
168 It is arguable that in cases where there are circumstances justifying a finding
that the absentee is dead, protective measures may be constitutionally dispensed
with. If proof of death had been made by direct evidence, no protective measure
would have been required and, since a fact may be established by circumstantial
evidence as well, no protective measure should be required in the latter instance. See
Jackson v. Richardson, 182 Ark. 997, 1003, 33 S.W.2d 1095, 1097-98 (1930).
1,9 Bohrer, supra note 148, at 204.
270 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-19 (e) (Supp. 1965).
The Maryland fund did not state a fixed percentage to be initially applied, but
rather provided that the "Treasurer shall, from time to time, prescribe the rate to be
charged for the insurance fund on the basis of actuarial experience." MD. ANN. CODE
art. 16, § 210 (4) (1957).
271 While not allowing the treasurer to change the rate to be charged an estate,
the Uniform Act does provide that if the "accumulated fund increases to an amount
actuaifly found to be in excess of reasonable requirements" the court may authorize
the treasurer to reduce it by transferring part of the fund to the general fund of the
State Treasury. UNIFORM ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY Aar
§ 11(4).
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age of the absentee and his state of health.1 2 While North Caro-
lina's flexible rate provision could be advantageously amended to
provide for such contingencies, it is certainly a commendable ad-
vance in the direction of greater efficacy in use of the insurance
fund.
INSURANCE AS AN ASSET OF THE ABSENTEE'S ESTATE
Only a few states have enacted special provisions designed to
cover those situations where life insurance is an asset of the missing
person's estate. 73 The North Carolina act authorizes the judge at
the time of a distribution to order payment of the proceeds of any
life insurance policy on the life of the absentee, based on the five-
year absence of the insured. Such distribution is to be made "to the
proper parties as their interest may appear."'174 In the event that
the insurer refuses to make payment under these circumstances; the
judge is authorized to determine all issues arising under supple-
mental pleadings then filed, provided that issues of fact are to be
tried by a jury.1 5 If the insured's death is established in such-a
proceeding,7 6 the proceeds of the policy shall be paid forthwith.
However, if such death cannot be factually proved, the judge may
1 72 Bohrer, supra note 148, at 204.
173 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-20-9 (1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 209 (1957);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18 (a) (Supp. 1965); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1812 (1955); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 268.30 (1957).
Indiana provides that one holding or entitled to the proceeds of any life insurance
policy on the life of an absentee need only prove death for these purposes by showing
five years absence, provided that such proof is not prohibited by the contract. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 7-2302 (1953).
171 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18 (a) (Supp. 1965).
It should be noted that this section does not refer to a distribution of the ab-
sentee's estate based on a finding of death under § 28A-11 (a). Presumably, the
insurer's obligation to pay over the proceeds of the policy under these circumstances
would be unquestionable.
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18 (b) (Supp. 1965).
170 Section 28A-18 (b) does not specify the nature or amount of evidence necessary
to make a finding of death. However, it would seem that § 28A-1 should be read
together with § 28A-18 (b) as indicating the standard of proof in this instance. The
former section provides that "in any action under this chapter, where the death of a
person ... is in issue the fact that he has been absent from his place of residence,
unheard of for seven years, or for any other period, creates no presumption requiring
the judge or the jury to find that he is now deceased. The issue shall be decided by
the judge or jury as one of fact upon the evidence." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-1 (Supp.
1965). (Emphasis added.) Presumably this encompasses circumstantial as well as
direct evidence of death. Section 28A-1 (b) provides that "if during such absence the
person has been exposed to a specific peril of death, this fact shall be considered
by the judge; or if there be a jury, shall be sufficient evidence to be submitted to
the jury." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-1 (b) (Supp. 1965).
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not order the policy paid.17 7 The policy does not remain extant
and unenforceable in this event, however. "The fact remains that
the insured has disappeared and his whereabouts [are] unknown
for more than 5 years and that under the terms of... [the North
Carolina act] his property is distributable as though he were
dead. ' 178 Therefore, the act provides that the receiver may demand
the payment of the cash surrender value or obtain a loan on the
policy. The receiver's receipt for such payment will release the
insurer from all claims under the policy.179
It is to be noted that the North Carolina statute also provides
that if the beneficiary's survival of the absentee is "not established"
and the insured absentee owns an interest in the policy, the pro-
ceeds of the insurance will be considered part of the absentee's
estate and will be distributed under the regular provisions of the
act. 80 Since distribution under a statute of limitations act pre-
supposes an inability to establish the fact of death, it is not clear to
what point in time the beneficiary must survive in the instance
where the insurance company does not object to payment on the
policy at the end of five years absence or where the surrender value
is paid at this time. In such event, the policy is to be paid to "the
proper parties as their interests may appear,"'' and to qualify as a
proper party a beneficiary must survive the absentee. The refer-
ent cannot be the time of the insured's death because the fact of
death has not been at issue in the proceedings. The only logical
alternative is the beneficiary's survival of the five-year period of
limitation. 82 It is suggested that this point in time should be made
more definite . 8
North Carolina appears to have avoided many of the problems
that may arise with respect to life insurance. By providing for
an action to "determine all issues arising upon the pleadings" when
177Since the insurer's liability is conditioned upon the death of the insured,
to order full payment of an insurance policy without establishing death would
arguably be an impairment of the obligation of the contract and repugnant to
article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution.
178 S MCIAL REPORT 23. (Emphasis added.)
19 N.C. GIEN. STAT. § 28A-18 (d) (Supp. 1965).
180N.C. Gmq. STAT. § 28A-18 (c) (Supp. 1965).
"-
1N.C. GFa. STAT. § 28A-18(a) (Supp. 1965). See text accompanying note 174
supra.
182 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-11 (c) (Supp. 1965).
"8 See 1942 Wis. L. REv. 280, 287.
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the insurance company refuses to make payment on the policy, 8 4
it is assumed that there will be a resolution of the time when death
has occurred as well as the factual determination of death. The
former would be important if it were contended that the period of
time within which action upon the policy must be brought has
passed, 85 that the policy has lapsed through failure to pay pre-
miums, 8 6 or that the beneficiary has failed to survive the insured.
CONCLUSION
The, problems which may be occasioned by the disappearance
of a person can best be handled by statutes which provide for the
expeditious creation of a flexible conservatorship and for distribu-
tion of the absentee's property at a time dictated by the realities
of the particular situation. The conservator should have sufficient
authority to enable him to act on the absentee's behalf in protecting
property, caring for dependents and satisfying obligations left be-
hind. Distribution should occur at a time or under circumstances
which reasonably indicate that the absentee will not return, and the
distribution scheme should in some manner provide for the possi-
bility of the absentee's return.
As a model for the furtherance of such ends, the recently enacted
North Carolina act appears to be the most satisfactorily equipped
statute to date. By making final distribution the last act in a receiver-
"" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18 (b) (Supp. 1965).
285 Some insurance contracts provide that suit must be brought within one year
after the death of the insured. 1942 Wis. L. REV. 280, 283-84. This type of provision
would pose difficult problems for those who rely on a period of unexplained absence
to establish death. Although a decree of death may, for example, be obtained at the
end of seven years, the court may determine the date of death as being three years
previous to the decree. Such an insurance contract would by its terms prevent
collection. Id. at 284.
The majority rule in states employing a presumption of death statute is that the
statute of limitations is suspended until the termination of the presumptive period.
Presumably this would also be true in states employing a statute of limitation ab-
sentee statute. See id. at 285.
The Uniform Act attempts to solve this problem by declaring that such shortened
periods of limitation are of no effect. UNIFORM ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND
ABSENmTES' PROPERTY ACT § 2.
188 The North Carolina act specifically provides that the court-appointed receiver
is to pay insurance premiums. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-8 (4) (Supp. 1965). By so pro-
viding, the policy will not lapse through nonpayment during the statutory five-year
period of limitation. If at the end of this time death is found to have occurred
three years prior to the expiration of the limitation period, the estate would pre-
sumably be entitled to a refund of premiums paid after the determined date of
death.
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ship scheme, the property can be conserved during the running of
the time before final distribution can be made. In addition, the
unique features relating to conservation and administration of small
estates, disposal of life insurance policies of the absentee, and the
absentee insurance fund all extend adequate coverage to problems
which had previously perplexed the states. It is suggested that older
statutes which appear inadequate in light of modern conditions
might efficaciously be revised along the lines of the North Carolina
statute.
t.s.p.
i.w.d.
